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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
or to allow the defendant to receive the benefits of the contract
without compensating for them. It chooses the lesser evil and calls
the contract void. The defense is allowed not as a protection to
the defendant4 but as a disability to the plaintiff for his unconscionable conduct.
H. B. S.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT-WHAT

CONSTITUTES-APPEAL

FROM.-

Judgment was recovered by plaintiff after an inquest at Trial Term,
before which proceeding defendant had asked for an adjournment
which was refused. After reversal by the Appellate Division of an
order granted in Special Term vacating the inquest and granting a
new trial, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held, no
appeal lies from a final judgment to review an intermediate order
refusing to vacate an inquest. Jensen v. Union Railway Company
of New York City, 260 N. Y. 1, 182 N. E. 226 (1932).
Judgment by default may be entered upon defendant's failure to
appear, after issue has been joined, when the case is called for trial.'
However, is it a judgment by default when defendant appears on the
day set for trial and requests an adjournment? The rule in New
York is fairly well settled that defendant is in default 2 and that his
remedy is to make a motion to vacate the judgment.3 However, if at
the time of trial, defendant has his request put on record, the judgment is not by default.4 Though a mere technicality, the result is
far-reaching. The right of appeal is not inherent and did not exist at
common law, but it is purely a matter of statute. 5 Accordingly, no
appeal will lie from a default judgment since the right is denied by
statute. 6 If the defendant has his objection put on record, since the
'Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343 (1775).
1 Pierce, etc. Mfg. Co. v. Kleinfeld, 53 Misc. 260, 103 N. Y. Supp. 86
(1907); Emmanuele v. Fruit Auction Co., 93 Misc. 493, 157 N. Y. Supp.

282 (1916).

'Silverman v. Mark, 148 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1914). See Flake v. Van
Wagenen, 54 N. Y. 25 (1873) for reasons denying appeal from default judgment.
'White v. Sebring, 228 App. Div. 413, 240 N. Y. Supp. 477 (3rd Dept.
1930).
'Citizens' Trust Co. of Utica v. R. Prescott & Son, 221 App. Div. 426,
223 N. Y. Supp. 191 (4th Dept. 1927).
'Croveno v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 225, 228, 44 N. E. 968, 969
(1896).
"N. Y. C. P. A. §557, subd. 1: "A party aggrieved may appeal in a case
provided by law. He may not appeal from a judgment or order rendered or
made upon his default unless an appeal therefrom be expressly authorized by
law."

RECENT DECISIONS
judgment is not one by default, an appeal may be taken to the Court
of Appeals, 7 after the Appellate Division has reversed an order granting a new trial.
R. L. L.

ELECTION OF DIRECTORS-RIGHT OF VOTING TRUSTEE TO VOTE

BY PRox.-The voting trustees of the Bellanca Aircraft Corporation

held a meeting for the election of directors. The defendant, William
Bellanca, cast the number of votes granted him by virtue of his trust
and also voted for another trustee by proxy. The plaintiff attacked
the validity of such proxy on the grounds that it violated the trust
relation in depriving the beneficiaries of the trustee's judgment. The
defendant in his answer sets up the principle that what a proxy does
in the proper exercise of his power is the will of the principal.' Held,
a voting trustee may delegate his unrestricted right to vote to a proxy
if the terms of the trust so permit. Cluindler v. Belta ca Aircraft
Corporationet al., - Del. Ch. -, 162 Atl. 63 (1932).
The chancellor in support of his decision declared there was no
breach of trust. The instrument setting forth the rights of the trustees declared that they should "possess and shall be entitled in their
discretion to exercise all the rights and powers as absolute owners of
the shares * * * including the unrestricted right to vote. The trustees
may act through a majority in person or by proxy * * * and said act
performed either in person or by proxy shall be the act of the
trustees." Therefore there has been no violation of the trust and no
cause of action exists.
In New York two of the three recognized methods by which stock
may be voted by one other than the owner are the voting trust and
the proxy.2 Voting trusts are based upon the recognized right of
stockholders to use their property in any way not contrary to law.3
As a matter of legislative discretion this claim was later revoked in
the instance of banking corporations. 4 The right to vote by proxy not
being an ordinary privilege requires legal consent, given by the New
York Corporation Laws to all corporations except religious and bank7N. Y. C. P. A. §588.

Hexter v. Colombia Baking Co., 16 Del. Ch. 263, 145 Atl. 115 (1929).
Randall & Sons v. Lucke et al., 123 Misc. 5, 205 N. Y. Supp. 121
(1924); N. Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW (1932) §50; GEx. Cop. LAw (1932) §19.
aManson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918) ; Matter of Morse,
1

2William

247 N. Y. 290, 160 N. E. 374 (1928); Harris v. Magril, 131 Misc. 380, 226
N. Y. Supp. 621 (1928).
'Matter of Morse, supra note 3; N. Y. STocx CoRr. LAW (1932) §50

(amended 1920, c. 120).

